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A key element of the prosperity agenda of the Security and Prosperity Partnership
of North America is a commitment of the NAFTA partners to liberalize NAFTA
rules of origin and to enact minor modifications to third-country tariffs in cases where
such changes will increase competitiveness. A recent study for the province of Alberta
suggested several criteria for enacting tariff “streamlining” and calculated annual benefit
of CAN$ 80 million for exporters located in Alberta. This study applies the Alberta
methodology to examine the results of implementing similar modifications to NAFTA
tariffs for exports from Washington and California to Canada. We also identify the
impediments to tariff streamlining such as inconsistent tariff line classifications at the
8 and 10-digit level. These inconsistencies point to benefits from adopting comparable
intra-NAFTA tariff codes down to the 10-digit level.

1. INTRODUCTION
The Security and Prosperity Partnership
of North America (SPP) is an initiative
launched in 2005 by the leaders of
Canada, Mexico, and the United States
to promote security and prosperity
through cooperation and sharing of
information. One component of the
prosperity agenda is a Working Group
on the movement of goods which
was created to pursue the following
objectives:
… lower the transaction costs
of trade in goods by liberalizing
the requirements for obtaining
duty-free
treatment
under
NAFTA, including through the
reduction of “rules of origin”
costs on goods traded between our
countries. Each country should
have in place procedures to allow
speedy implementation of rules
of origin modifications. Increase
competitiveness
by
exploring
additional supply chain options,
such as by rationalizing minor
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differences in external tariffs,
consistent
with
multilateral
negotiation strategies.
(Source:

http://www.spp.gov/prosperity_

working/index.asp?dName=prosperity_
working)

This goal involves both the
liberalization of NAFTA rules of origin
and relatively minor “rationalization”
of NAFTA third-country tariffs in cases
where the differences between the
NAFTA partners’ third-country tariff
rates are small.
Rules of origin are a feature of free
trade areas such as NAFTA but are not
needed within a customs union such
as exists within the European Union.
Members of a customs union impose
a common external tariff on nonmembers of the customs union, but
members of a free trade area are free to
set their own tariffs on imports from
countries outside of the free trade area.
If differences in tariffs are large enough,
1

Streamlining of
NAFTA Tariffs:
Benefits for
Washington State
Aaron Hayman
and

Paul Storer, Ph.D.

non-members of a free trade area might
have an incentive to channel exports
to all members of the free trade area
through the lowest-tariff country. To
eliminate this incentive, free trade areas
establish procedures to prevent the
routing of non-member exports through
a “back door” route via the lowesttariff partner. In the case of NAFTA,
rules of origin are used to establish
whether a good originates within North
America and is thus able to benefit from
preferential NAFTA tariff rates at the
borders between the NAFTA partners.
Complying with rules of origin is costly
for exporters, however, and under the
SPP, NAFTA countries are seeking to
reduce the burden of rules of origin in
order to enhance the competitiveness
of North American producers.
Given that the NAFTA countries are
pursuing the objective of liberalizing
or eliminating rules of origin, policy
makers on both sides of the border
need to measure the potential impact
of liberalizing rules of origin and
rationalizing NAFTA tariffs. Such an
analysis of tariff rationalization was
recently conducted for the province of
Alberta by Ballantyne, Hoffman, and
Mirus (2004), who proposed an agenda
for tariff rationalization which they
refer to as a “streamlining” of NAFTA
tariffs.
The Ballantyne et al study
found that a conservative estimate of
the savings for Alberta was CAN$ 80
million per year based on trade patterns
from 2002. They argued that a similar

2

benefit would accrue to U.S. partners so
that the tariff modifications enhance
the competitiveness of firms on both
sides of the Canada-U.S. border. The
authors also noted that these benefits
can be attained through administrative
agreements and therefore would not
require high-level trade negotiations
that could have the potential to become
highly-politicized.
The primary goal of this paper is to
apply the Ballantyne et al analysis to the
case of Washington State. An additional
motivation for the analysis conducted
in this study is the focus on a perimeter
approach to border policy found in
the policy documents of both the SPP
and the Perimeter Clearance Coalition.
For goods, the core idea of the 2002
version of the Perimeter Clearance
Strategy is to “[deal] with goods at
point of first arrival” in North America.
The customs authority of the receiving
country would then share information
with a partner country if the good is in
transit. This coordination and sharing
of information provides an additional
opportunity to streamline NAFTA
tariffs whenever North American origin
can be conferred at the first point of
entry to the continent. This study will
discuss the complementarities between
the goals of tariff streamlining and a
perimeter clearance strategy.

2. STUDY METHODOLOGY
NAFTA-related initiatives to liberalize
rules of origin have been implemented
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in four batches: on January 1 of 2003
and 2005 and on July 1 of 2005 and
2006. These changes to rules of origin
have typically involved removing
regional value content restrictions
or reducing the degree of tariff
classification transformation needed to
qualify as originating in North America.
For example, among the liberalizations
implemented on July 1, 2006, was the
removal of restrictions on the use of
non-originating printed circuit boards
in televisions and monitors. These
liberalizations have typically been
initiated based on suggestions solicited
from industry.
To date, there has been almost no
ex post analysis of the qualitative and
quantitative impacts of liberalizing
rules of origin. Nevertheless, the agenda
continues to move forward. For example,
an August 2007 Globe and Mail article
quoted Canadian International Trade
Minister David Emerson who indicated
that “a key topic” of the August 2007
NAFTA Free Trade Commission would
be “more talk on changing rules of
origin.” Minister Emerson said that
these changes would “cover billions of
dollars in trade, so it’s actually a very
material initiative that most people
never think of but it’s of fundamental
importance and will greatly enhance
the scope of NAFTA.” The fact that there
is political will to continue the process
of liberalizing rules of origin reveals the
benefits that the NAFTA governments
expect to derive from the process.

While the SPP raises the possibility of
harmonization of third-country tariffs
in cases where existing differences are
minor, this avenue has not been pursued
as aggressively as the liberalization of
rules of origin. This paper provides some
information regarding the potential to
harmonize certain third country tariffs
in cases where the United States already
charges low or zero tariffs in the general
system of preferences. In addition, this
study takes the first component of a
methodology proposed by Ballantyne
et al and applies this component to the
case of trade between Washington State
and Canada. Ballantyne et al suggested
that there are three cases in which
Canadian and U.S. third-country tariffs
could be streamlined for a particular
Harmonized Tariff Schedule (HTS) code:
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(i) Canada and the United States
already apply 0 percent tariffs for
non-NAFTA countries,
(ii) Either Canada and/or the United
States applies a tariff of no more
than 5 percent for non-NAFTA
countries,
(iii) Situation (ii) does not apply but
the Canadian and U.S. nonNAFTA tariff rates are within 2
percentage points of each other.
The conditions outlined in these three
cases are motivated by the ostensible
goal of rules of origin: to prevent
goods from non-NAFTA countries
from entering one NAFTA country via
a NAFTA partner in order to benefit
3
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from lower third-country tariff rates in
the partner country. In case (i) there is
no incentive whatsoever to circumvent
third-country tariffs by entering the
United States via a NAFTA partner.
In cases (ii) and (iii) there is a small
incentive to use the “back door” entry
approach, but the benefit is sufficiently
small that it is unlikely to motivate a
trade routing decision.

Following Ballantyne et al, we examine
the estimated benefits of their first case
of proposed tariff streamlining. To
accomplish this, we begin by obtaining
data on exports from Washington to
Canada at the 6-digit HS level. We use
the 6-digit level of detail rather than the
more precise 8 or 10-digit level because
HS codes are only harmonized between
Canada and the United States at the

Table 1: Sources of U.S. Tariff Revenues of HS Chapter

4

Chapter
Rank

HS
Code

Calculated
Duties

Chapter
Share

Cumulative
Share

1

62

$4,389,441,874

17.4%

17.4%

2

61

$4,285,014,712

17.0%

34.5%

3

87

$2,883,414,732

11.5%

45.9%

4

64

$1,873,663,256

7.4%

53.4%

5

85

$1,681,935,892

6.7%

60.1%

6

84

$1,161,471,270

4.6%

64.7%

7

42

$997,761,085

4.0%

68.7%

8

39

$769,535,433

3.1%

71.7%

9

63

$678,851,851

2.7%

74.4%

10

94

$407,576,790

1.6%

76.0%

11

22

$319,121,030

1.3%

77.3%

12

29

$314,423,520

1.2%

78.5%

13

71

$290,379,112

1.2%

79.7%

14

69

$286,150,147

1.1%

80.8%

15

90

$284,384,139

1.1%

82.0%

16

40

$273,377,671

1.1%

83.1%

17

27

$258,338,450

1.0%

84.1%

18

73

$247,323,006

1.0%

85.1%

19

82

$241,847,428

1.0%

86.0%

20

70

$201,099,847

0.8%

86.8%

21-30

-

$1,461,676,302

5.8%

92.6%

31-40

-

$894,424,188

3.6%

96.2%

41-50

-

$535,194,982

2.1%

98.3%

1-99

-

$25,159,011,720

100%

100%
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6-digit level. We first use third-country
tariff data from the World Trade
Organization to identify cases where
rules of origin could be eliminated
because both Canada and the United
States already allow the HS6 category
to enter duty free1. Existing estimates
of the resource costs of rules of origin
compliance2 are then used to determine
the competitiveness-enhancing benefits
of the tariff streamlining.

3. THE STRUCTURE OF TARIFFS
IN U.S. TRADE
The benefits of liberalizing rules of
origin and streamlining tariffs need
to be compared to the costs of these
measures. One such cost is the tariff
revenue already forgone in cases where
both countries have most favored

nation tariffs that are set to zero. A
rough measure of the revenue yielded
by the current U.S. tariff system is
provided by Table 1. This table is based
on total value of duties for 2006 as
calculated by the on-line Dataweb
trade statistics from the web site of the
U.S. International Trade Commission3.
The calculated duties were obtained
and sorted for the 99 HS chapters.
Table 1 shows that just four chapters
accounted for over half of calculated
U.S. customs duties, while the top 30
chapters yielded over 90 percent of tariff
revenue. Figure 1 plots the cumulative
share of tariffs yielded by successive
sorted HS chapters. The results in this
figure suggest that most tariffs are low
and, as a result, the opportunity cost of
zero tariffs is not high.

Figure 1: Cumulative Share of U.S. Tariff Revenues
100%

Share of Total Calculated Duties

90%
80%
70%
60%
50%
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We will use the common term “most favored
nation tariffs” to refer to
the normal tariffs paid
by countries that do not
benefit from the NAFTA
tariff preference. In the
United States, the term
“most favored nation
tariff” was recently
replaced by the term
“general tariff” that applies to countries having
“normal trade relations”
with the United States
but not benefiting from
a bilateral trade agreement. As of November
2007, the only countries
that do not benefit from
either normal trade
relations or a bilateral
trade agreement with the
United States are Cuba
and North Korea.
1

40%

Compliance cost figures
are cited by Ballantyne
et al and also available
from Kunimoto and
Sawchuk (2005).
2

30%
20%
10%
0%
0

10

20

30

40

50

60

Number of HS Chapters

70

80

90

100

These data can be accessed at http://dataweb.
usitc.gov/.
3
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The origin of movement
data released by the
U.S. Census Bureau are
intended to capture the
state where the shipment
of goods originated rather
than the state where the
goods left the United
States.
4

Canada and the United
States frequently use
8-digit and 10-digit categories within a 6-digit
category. As a result,
third-country tariffs
might be zero for just a
portion of a 6-digit HS
code.
5

6

The results presented in Table 1 and
Figure 1 suggest that many HS chapters
provide very little tariff revenue. Indeed,
in 2006 four HS chapters generated no
tariff revenue at all while calculated
tariffs were under one million dollars
for an additional 11 HS chapters. These
chapters, and perhaps others generating
minimal tariff revenue, are certainly
candidates for elimination of rules of
origin because tariff revenues and most
favored nation tariff rates are so low
that there is little or no concern about
entry of U.S. imports through Canada.
The next section of this paper examines
the nature of Washington State exports
to Canada in order to determine how
much trade is a candidate for tariff
streamlining through elimination of
rules of origin.

strategy for tariff streamlining would
involve the removal of rules of origin for
any 6-digit HS code where both Canada
and the United States charge most
favored nation tariffs of zero. Rules of
origin are non-binding constraints for
Canada-U.S. trade in this case because
there is no incentive for third-country
imports to circumvent higher tariffs
in either Canada or the United States
simply by entering through the country
with the lower third-country tariffs. We
used 2006 tariff schedules for Canada
and the United States and identified
1,464 6-digit HS codes with tariffs of
zero for all lines within these codes5.
Mexico is not included in the analysis
of this paper because the number of HS6
codes where all three NAFTA partners
have a zero external tariff is very small.

4. A DESCRIPTION OF TRADE
BETWEEN WASHINGTON STATE
AND CANADA

The properties of the 1,464 6-digit HS
codes with zero tariffs in both countries
are examined in Table 2. These “0/0”
HS codes are grouped into six broad
categories based on the industrial
sector. For example, we found that
electrical equipment accounts for just
5 percent of the 0/0 HS6 codes, while

According to origin of movement
state export date from the U.S. Census
Bureau, the total value of exports from
the state of Washington to Canada
was $6.2 billion in 20064. The simplest

Table 2: Sectoral Description of Free 6-digit HS Categories
Category

Chapters

% of all lines

% Free

Agriculture

1-24

13%

26%

Energy Products

25-39

20%

27%

Other Commodities

40-83

38%

27%

Machinery & Equipment

84

15%

42%

Electrical Equipment

85

5%

27%

Other Manufactured Products

86-97

9%

24%
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commodities other than agricultural
and energy commodities were 38
percent of the 1,464 HS codes identified
as candidates for streamlining. The
fraction of the total HS codes that are
free for Canada and the United States
is constant for most of these industrial
sectors with the exception of Chapter
84, where the percentage of free HS6
codes is much higher because of the
sectoral customs union in computers
and computer parts built into the
original NAFTA agreement.
To measure the potential benefits of
streamlining rules of origin for trade
between Washington and Canada we
first find the total amount of exports
from Washington to Canada in the
1,464 free/free HS6 codes. These HS
codes themselves account for almost

40 percent of the total amount of
exports from Washington to Canada
and have a dollar value of $2.45 billion.
This amount suggests that significant
benefits could be obtained for trade
between Washington state and Canada
even if the scope of tariff streamlining
is relatively unambitious and limited in
scope to just a small set of high-value
export categories.
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While it is impractical to describe
all of the 1,464 tariffs that are zero for
Canada and the United States, Table
3 describes the largest 25 HS6 codes
for Washington-Canada trade and
identifies the 16 of these 25 HS6 codes
where both Canada and the United
States apply third-country tariffs equal
to zero. In contrast, Table 4 illustrates
the codes out of the top 25 where at least

Table 3: Washington State Exports to Canada - Top 25 6-digit HS Products
Rank

HS Code

1

Dollar Amount

Rank

HS Code

Dollar Amount

880240

$682,477,746

14

*

160411

$55,871,874

2

*

271019

$679,493,038

15

*

080920

$54,715,318

3

*

870120

$218,243,200

16

*

392330

$50,502,144

4

*

870423

$212,536,760

17

*

760612

$50,178,966

721420

$114,899,438

18

851750

$44,828,959

6

880330

$109,353,434

19

950410

$44,509,829

7

950490

101,444,160

20

*

842720

$43,134,024

080810

$98,586,732

21

*

761290

$42,956,680

852812

$84,503,341

22

*

852990

$42,801,482

760120

$73,408,501

23

*

200410

$39,518,023

260800

$67,282,831

24

843149

$39,504,952

25

190410

$35,449,023

5

8

*

9
10

*

11
12

*

890392

$64,286,104

13

*

870324

$62,817,772

*

*Indicates code for which both countries apply third-country tariff of 0.
7
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Table 4: Washington State Exports to Canada - Top 25 6-digit HS Products:
Non-Zero MFN Tariffs and Multiple 6-digit lines
Canada

United States

HS Code

Tariff Lines

Min/Max Tariff (%)

Tariff Lines

Min/Max Tariff (%)

271019

5

0/8

11

5.8 / 7

870120

1

6

1

4

870423

1

6.1

1

25

080810

2

0 / 8.5

1

0

760120

19

0

3

0 / 2.6

890392

1

9.5

1

1.5

870324

1

6.8

1

2.5

160411

1

2

2

0/6

080920

6

0/6

1

0

392330

2

0 / 6.5

1

3

760612

2

0/3

2

3 / 6.5

842720

4

0/6

2

0

761290

2

6.5

2

0 / 5.7

852990

41

0

34

0/5

200410

1

6

2

6.4 / 8

190410

7

4/6

1

1.1

one of the two countries applies a nonzero third-country MFN tariff or where
there are multiple and inconsistent
6-digit tariff “lines” within the 6-digit
HS codes. In some cases Canada and the
United States have the same number
of tariff lines but different MFN tariff
rates. An example is 870423 (diesel
trucks weighing more than 20 metric
tons) where the Canadian tariff is 6.1
percent and the U.S. tariff is 25 percent.
An example of inconsistent tariff lines
within a 6-digit category is the HS6 code
271019 (an “other” category within
the broader subheading of petroleum
oils) which has 5 separate tariff lines in
8

Canada and 11 lines in the United States.
These inconsistencies are due to the fact
that the two countries use inconsistent
product definitions and tariff codes at
the 8-digit level and this inconsistency
precludes tariff streamlining in HS6
codes such as 271019.

5. BENEFITS OF TARIFF
STREAMLINING FOR
WASHINGTON STATE EXPORTS
TO CANADA
To estimate the benefits of tariff
streamlining for Alberta, Ballantyne et al
applied a range of possible transactioncost values (expressed as percentages of
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overall value of a shipment) to obtain
a per-year cost of rules of origin for
Alberta’s exports that were candidates
for tariff streamlining. The transaction
costs used in the Alberta study were
obtained from other research for
free trade areas such as the EFTA and
ranged in value from 0.25 percent to
2 percent per year. The benefit of tariff
streamlining is that these costs can
be eliminated. For Washington State
exports to Canada, applying these
two percentages as lower and upper
bounds on transactions/compliance
costs related to rules of origin yields
annual savings in 2006 of between $6.1
million and $48.8 million per year.
With the 4 percent discount rate used
by Ballantyne et al, this translates into
a savings of between $153 million and
$1.22 billion in present value terms. It
is worth noting that these benefits are
associated with the tariff streamlining
that would be most easily implemented,
because these are for cases of 6-digit HS
codes where neither Canada nor the
United States applies MFN duties. No
tariff revenue would be lost from these
changes to rules of origin.
While these values for the benefits
of tariff streamlining are significant
even under the lowest percentage rate
assumptions, it would be useful to
refine the values in future work. One
possible way to do this is to determine
the restrictiveness of the rule of origin.
The more complicated and constraining
a rule of origin is, the more resources

will be expended to meet the rule.
Some evidence of this effect is provided
in the average restrictiveness column
of Figure 2. For each of the 1,464 HS6
codes, we determined the value of the
Estevadeordal (2000) rules-of-origin
restrictiveness index. The values of this
index range from 1 to 7, with higher
values indicating a more restrictive rule.
For example, a value of 6 indicates that
a transformation between chapters of
the HS code is needed while a value of
4 means that a transformation between
headings within a chapter is necessary
to establish North American origin.
Work by Kunimoto and Sawchuk
(2005) has shown that the utilization of
NAFTA preferences tends to decline as
rules of origin become more restrictive.
This suggests that removing the rules
of origin for the most restrictive rules
would increase use of NAFTA preferences
and encourage intra-NAFTA trade.
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As shown in Figure 2, we find that
restrictiveness levels are generally quite
high for the items in the agricultural,
energy, and commodity categories. For
some agricultural categories such as live
animals, the requirement of a chapterlevel change simply reflects the fact
that these items can’t be “produced”
from a mixture of originating and
non-originating
components.
The
restrictiveness level tends to be lower
when manufactured goods are considered
because of the greater ability to transform
intermediate products or raw materials
into a new manufactured item.
9
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Figure 2: Average Restrictiveness of Rules of Origin by Sector
7

6

5.8
5.4
4.9

5

4.3

4.1

4
2.9

3

2

1

0

Agriculture

Energy

Other
Commodities

One factor that could potentially
reduce the benefits of tariff streamlining
is the presence of a NAFTA “mini”
customs union in computers and
computer parts. This sectoral customs
union is confined to Chapters 84
and 85 of the tariff schedule and
we would expect no benefits from
tariff streamlining for HS codes that
are already part of the mini-union.
To investigate the effect of this for
Washington State, we recalculate the
benefits of tariff streamlining with
Chapters 84 and 85 excluded from the
trade figures. This adjustment for the
effect of the mini-union lowers the
annual benefits of tariff streamlining
from a range of $6.1 - $48.8 million
10

Machinery &
Equipment

Electrical
Equipment

Other Products

to $5.1 - $40.8 million. The reduction
for Washington is less extreme than for
other states such as California whose
exports to Canada include a greater
proportion of HS6 categories that are
covered by the mini-union.

6. CONCLUSIONS
This study has identified several
promising cases where simple changes
to administrative rules would result in
significant savings of transactions costs
for the state of Washington. Removal
of rules of origin requirements for a
number of products would also allow
border personal to shift some of their
time from rules of origin verification
to a focus on interdicting undesirable
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goods or individuals seeking entry to
the United States. This ability to shift
resources from low-value revenue
collection tasks to higher-value security
activities is one of the benefits of the
perimeter approach to border security.
The benefits of tariff streamlining for
Washington are significantly lower than
those calculated by Ballantyne et al who
found that just over CAN$ 25 billion in
trade would be liberalized under their
three criteria. The vast majority of this
amount – CAN$ 23 billion – is from the
Canada-U.S. zero MFN criterion also
applied in this study for Washington
State. Over half of the trade figure
for Alberta (CAN$ 14.4 billion) was
derived from Alberta’s exports of
natural gas. Several factors account for
our finding that the total amount of
exports from Alberta that would benefit
from proposed streamlining is greater
than our corresponding amount for
Washington:
- Ballantyne et al included a wider
range of products with low tariffs.
- Alberta has a large proportion of its
trade in a single commodity (natural
gas) that meets the streamlining
criteria.
- The volume of exports from Alberta
to the United States is much larger
than the volume of exports from
Washington State to Canada.
The results of our analysis for
Washington are sufficiently promising

to encourage further analysis of the
potential U.S. benefits from tariff
streamlining. It is worth noting that
much of the benefit of tariff streamlining
can be obtained by eliminating rules
of origin for a few HS6 codes with
large amounts of trade. In the case of
Washington, the increase in benefits
from examining the top 50 categories,
versus just the top 25, was relatively
modest: the range of estimated benefits
extends from $3.76 million to $30.1
million rather than from $3.2 million
to $25.8 million. On the other hand,
perhaps the greatest benefits of NAFTA
derive from the possibility of increased
trade by smaller exporters dealing
with less commonly traded goods.
These exporters might not benefit if
the elimination of rules of origin was
limited to a few large categories.
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In future work, we will also examine
a wider range of MFN categories, an
approach that appears promising given
our finding that tariff revenues are
largely derived from a relatively small
number of tariff categories. Finally,
we will investigate the benefits for
other U.S. states with eleventh export
flows to Canada. As shown in Table
5, Washington is ranked tenth among
states in terms of exports to Canada
(Washington is not one of the roughly
38 states that have Canada as their top
export market). The results of this future
analysis have the potential to point
toward a fruitful new avenue for trade
liberalization and enhanced prosperity
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Table 5: Rank of States by Exports to Canada, 2006
Rank

State

Exports

Rank

State

Exports

1

Michigan

23,794,064,614

28

Colorado

1,849,335,720

2

Unspecified

18,538,115,825

29

Arizona

1,841,227,759

3

Ohio

18,265,575,610

30

Louisiana

1,787,714,289

4

Texas

15,630,528,347

31

Oklahoma

1,716,650,338

5

California

14,194,028,221

32

Vermont

1,670,214,132

6

Illinois

12,332,757,035

33

Maryland

1,491,291,136

7

New York

12,225,961,099

34

Puerto Rico

1,387,530,482

8

Indiana

9,841,736,504

35

Arkansas

1,129,873,310

9

Pennsylvania

8,886,413,076

36

Mississippi

1,068,683,897

10

Tennessee

6,925,453,887

37

Nebraska

1,027,151,963

11

Washington

6,205,917,164

38

West Virginia

923,282,349

12

Kentucky

5,857,587,464

39

Maine

922,204,620

13

New Jersey

5,713,856,150

40

Utah

888,531,508

14

Wisconsin

5,446,924,974

41

North Dakota

726,737,792

15

North Carolina

5,379,008,696

42

Nevada

696,792,037

16

Missouri

4,818,171,600

43

Delaware

633,703,328

17

Georgia

4,706,549,260

44

NH

597,975,305

18

Minnesota

4,090,154,512

45

Idaho

561,323,984

19

Massachusetts

3,155,104,246

46

Rhode Island

548,178,866

20

South Carolina

3,151,955,223

47

Alaska

444,904,161

21

Iowa

3,065,278,684

48

South Dakota

438,180,037

22

Florida

2,992,233,765

49

Montana

433,532,268

23

Oregon

2,693,539,425

50

Wyoming

232,929,944

24

Virginia

2,635,557,781

51

New Mexico

194,284,677

25

Kansas

2,267,968,989

52

DC

25,861,148

26

Alabama

2,246,168,787

53

Hawaii

16,105,767

27

Connecticut

1,931,582,958

54

Virgin Islands

10,401,786

for the NAFTA countries. Security would
also be enhanced as border agency
resources can be switched from revenue
collection and enforcement of rules of
origin to security-related duties.
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